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BY FREDERICK C. GRANT
ONE wonders, sometimes, at the magic power which resides in
nam.es—as in that of the wonderful and mysterious great-
great-grandmother in George MacDonald's Princess and Curdie.
Names are not things—though in so saving we have no wish to
raise an ancient question once more !—but they nevertheless have
the power to shut off, arbitrarily, the further consideration of
things, or of other things than those in hand : and to open up new
ranges of perception, to release new meanings, to rise to heights
whence wider horizons, fresh backgrounds, new significances
appear. Words have a 'power of the keys,' 'to shut, and none
shall open ; to open, and none shall close.'
Two such magic names are Philosophy and Religion, words
whose spell reaches across long ages of time and touches, directly
or indirectly, most human hearts. And when these words are
combined, as in some double and compounded formula of the
hidden art ; when we speak of 'the Philosophy of Religion,' what
meaning have the words in their new relation? Might one reverse
the process of compounding, and speak of the 'Religion of Philoso-
phy,' and get a meaning out of it—as one might reverse or trans-
form a mathematical equation ? Indeed, I feel sure a meaning
would result : one thinks of holy men of old, of consecrated intel-
lectual geniuses like Plato and Spinoza, and many another, whose
philosophy was a religion as well, and for whom the life of reason
and the life of religion were set in no contradiction but were fruits
of the selfsame vital tree—the abandonment of the soul, the loss of
self, in the pursuit of the supremely Real.
But 'Philosophy of Religion'—this is our theme ; what meaning
has it, what meanings does it open up, and what does it exclude?
* A lecture delivered in Wieboldt Hall, Northwestern University, Novem-
ber 15, 1928.
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What is its object and purpose? \\'hat are its prospects and
promises of success? Is it more than a hint of what passes human
knowing, like the essence of essences, hke the inside view of an
atom, Hke the 'sound' of a color or the 'color' of a sound? ' Or is
it. on the contrary, a solid, substantial, and entirel}' unfanciful
segment in the rounded whole of empirical, factual knowledge?
Now it has happened that 'Philosophy of Religion' has been so
understood
—
great is the power of names and of their associations
and family relationships—so that some thinkers and students have
supposed religion could be reduced to formulae, and 'Philosophy
of Religion' be set on the shelf beside 'Philosophy of Mechanics'
or 'Philosoph}- of Magnetism.' Indeed, the parallel suggests at
once the era when Philosophy of Religion was thus understood.
]\Ien also wrote of 'Philosophy of History,' and reached similar
results : Histor}' became a great machine, with successive thrusts
and counter-thrusts of great driving rods, with successive expan-
sions and contractions pushing or produced by the mighty pistons
of the active human consciousness. And 'philosophy," in this
particular cycle of meanings, became only the synonym of explana-
tion, formtilation, analytical description, or even of mathematical
exposition. I do not wish to underrate all this: it was one step in
the process by which Philosophy of Religion has arrived at its
present state ; and there is meaning still, a permanent meaning, in
the term which finally supplanted it in this phase of investigation,
namely, the 'Science' of Religion. But the danger was real that
in such an understanding of the Philosophy of Religion, i. e., as
scientific explanation, research itself should lose sight of 'the many-
splendored thing' of which it was in quest. Just as Biology had to
advance beyond Anatomy, and study the living, not the dead,
organism ; so Philosophy of Religion has had to move forward from
the analysis, classification, and formulation of dead or dying
religions to the study of the living religious impulse, with its varied
and sometimes unpredictable manifestations, with its curious
fashions, its strong undercurrents of feeling, its inexplicable and
indeed ineffable elements, its mysticism and its heroism, its 'war in
the members,' its instinctive urge to abolish certain instincts, its
strange ancient ways and its flaming novelties, its roots in folk-way
and primitive custom, its ethereal rationality and its logic-defying
'reasons' for the things religious men and women do. In a word,
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the history of religion has had to be supplemented by the Psy-
chology of Religion for a thoroughly sound basis to be provided
the modern Philosophy of Religion.
Finally, still another interpretation has been offered : Philosophy
of Religion is the investigation of the light religion has to cast upon
the major problem and question of all modern scientific and philo-
sophic research, viz., man's place in the universe, and the meaning
and purpose—if any—of his fitful parade across the briefly lighted
stage of human society upon this small, aged, and lonely planet.
That is, instead of explaining religion, either in terms of some
mechanistic formula—a notion derived from the beginnings of the
present machine age, when the idea of machinery first strongly
seized upon the imaginations of men—or else in terms of science
taken in the later and broader sense of modern biology and psy-
chology; instead of explaining religion, men seek to explain the
universe, and themselves in relation to it, and they call upon
religion for whatever valid interpretations it has to make of the
riddle of existence. One might almost say that the history of the
Philosophv of Religion in the 19th century and later has run
through these three stages, taken broadly—in the succession of
Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Pfleiderer, James, and some among
our contemporaries.
But the question recurs, Ts this what Philosophy of Religion
means? Does any one of the suggested series of limitations really
exhaust its meaning or significance? I must confess that, as for
mvself, though the emphasis in each seems strongly needed—espec-
ialh' the last two—and though strongly preferring the last of all,
if a choice must be made, no one of them is exhaustive or com-
pletely satisfactory. What I propose is the choice of an objective
that shall embrace all three—and still leave room for more. What
I mean to say is this: 'Philosophy of Religion' is not the definition
of a certain mass of subject-matter, or the anticipatory description
of a set of all-embracing, all-explaining formulae ; Philosophy of
Religion means a method of approach, of study, of asking questions,
or reaching out toward reality; in brief, 'Philosophy' of Religion
means the philosophic study of Religion.
And what has such a method of approach in view, what are
its prospects, what does it promise? As Professor Bridgman has
said of the science of Physics,^ it is one thing to ask questions
—
^ The Logic of Modern Physics, pp. 28 ff.
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an\one can do that, from the babe in arms to the hoary questioner,
'ever learning, and ne\er able to come to the knowledge of the
truth'-—but it is quite another thing to ask the right questions,
either questions that admit of an answer, or that are relevant, and
lead to some answer, e\'en if not the one intended or anticipated.
Now the philosophic study of religion, as I understand it, is
no resignation of the ])hilosophic quest in general, no shedding of
the pallium, but is still the ardent pursuit of truth, wherever and
howsoever arrived at; it is still "thinking in terms of the whole;'
it is still the unflagging quest for that view of reality that corres-
ponds, really corresponds, with human experience in all its length
and breadth, its height and de])th, in richest knowledge and ablest
skill, in strictest logic and in sublimest achievement of ethical
character; philosophy is still philosophy—the love of the true, the
beautiful, and the good. Xor, in this definition, does religion cease
to be that factor in human experience which comes nearest achiev-
ing this realization of the whole—certainly for the broad mass of
men and for man\' of the noblest—religion, which binds men into
unity, which sweeps aside the mists and bids men see larger back-
grounds than are envisaged in their daily toil, which steadily urges
upon men that old divine discontent with things seen and temporal
and bids them search for things unseen and eternal. It is no
formula we want, no mere explanation of certain historical phen-
omena ; it is realitw We wish not merely to understand but to
live.
A great, pervasive, overwhelming tide of realism is sweeping
the world in our generation. Shams and artifices are mere dykes
of sand before this rising tide ; 'time makes' even 'ancient good
uncouth,' and only what reall\' is, can endure. W'hether or not
ancient formulae hold, whether any formulae at all will hold, we
demand to find out the best and worst that life holds, and from
the bottom of our hearts we crave contact with reality. Though it
slay us, we must seek it. Though Pandora's box spread endless ills,
though the sphinx himself warn us against asking the fatal question,
we cannot refrain, for we are made like that. Of certain things, one
'just must know,' and that is all there is to it. For my part, I find
this spirit of our age exceedingly exhilarating. It may be carried to
excess—in things that do not really matter in such a quest ; as in ask-
ing the WTong questions, meaningless, stupid, or even idiotic ques-
2 11 Tim. iii. 7.
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tions or questions that lead nowhere, whether answered or not ; or
questions that have ah-eady been asked and answered ten-thousand
times and more. But the essential question-asking, reality-pursu-
ing quality in the modern mind is, at least to some of us, a
mark of what may really be holy zeal, and may lead eventu-
ally to one of the profoundest and most universal religious move-
ments the world has ever seen—all the profounder and the more
widespread now that civilization is tending toward a unity the
whole world around. This is itself at least a latent phenomenon
of religion, and one of the latest. I could illustrate it in a dozen
ways, if there were time: in the current movement toward Church-
unity, one of the most obvious examples ; in saner missionary
efforts ; in universal education ; in the motives leading men in the
direction of social welfare and justice, of international peace,
world hygiene and sanitation, world-wide medicine and surgery,
religious and political tolerance—all these illustrate the burning
thirst for reality that has taken possession of men's souls. Why
should we retain social shibboleths and antiquated political for-
mulae that only dig trenches for men to die in like vermin ; why
uphold ancient ecclesiastical prejudices which only lead to spiritual
sterility and futility, to ridiculous competition, and effectually par-
alyze the religious sense of men?
Reality we want, as never before, and no fine-spun systems of
dreamers sitting comfortably in their studies, far from the crush
and turmoil of life! That note I hear all the time, and on all
hands, and in philosophy no less than in common life; and that
note, I believe, is no discordant one, but the signal of an oncoming
change in the motif, the arrival of what is to be the major move-
ment in this vast symphony of the inner life of man. It is itself
very close to religion, perhaps the very harbinger and prophet
preparing the way for the coming of a new era in spiritual develop-
ment.
Now if it be true, as many persons hold, that philosophy is not
a purely timeless pursuit, and that the spirit of each age is reflected
in the philosophy which it produces, we shall not be greatly sur-
prised if the ethos of our age is reflected in its philosophy of
religion. That is, the method of the philosophic study of religion
will be—so far as it is possible under the circumstances—the
method of the pursuit of knowledge in general and of reflection
upon phenomena generally which is in vogue in other departments
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of human interest. The method, in a word will be scientific, so
far as that method applies in a philosophic study—of religion or
anything else. And the spirit will be this spirit of inquiry after
reality, of pursuit of truth wheresoever and howsoever to be found.
For the Christian Church, or churches, this will mean an entire
reshaping of our old-fashioned apologetics ; indeed, it may easily
turn out that a thorough-going philosophy of religion will take the
place of the old apologetics—and this without loss, but rather with
gain, to the ends which true religion has at stake. "Ye shall know
the truth ; and the truth shall make you free."^ Religion has noth-
ing to fear from the new method, the new freedom, so long as it
is freedom in the service of truth. And for those who stand out-
side the immediate circle of the Church's membership, this new
approach surely means clearing away the obstructions which have
for too long impeded progress. There are those, alas, who can
scarcely think of religion dissociated from some particular type of
ecclesiasticism—the formalism of one, the fanaticism of another,
or the chill and arid intellectual dogmatism of some third tvpe.
The philosophic or thought-out exposition of religion, or its dialec-
tical defense, has too often included a defense of things really
indefensible, or partial, or even partisan. 'Mint, anise, and cum-
min' have been tithed, while 'the weightier matters of the Law' were
left out of view.'* So that Religion and Ecclesiasticism have come
to be identified—whereas, no genuinely religious man or woman,
however highly valuing the outward expressions of the Visible
Church, would for a moment admit the justice of such an identi-
fication.
Now it so happens that this brings us face to face with the
first problem of the philosophic study of religion, and indeed of
any philosophy of religion, viz., What is religion? What is the
extent, and what are the limitations, of this particular field of
philosophical inquiry? We might halt at this point for the rest of
the evening, discussing various definitions of religion, and finding
value, no doubt, in every one of them. But I doubt if, in the end,
everyone present would be satisfied w^th the chosen definition ; and
so I venture to face that danger at once, rather than later, and
offer—if not a definition—at least a general statement: Religion
is the awareness of God, and the consequences thereof. Those
3 John viii. 32.
4 Matt, xxiii. 23.
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consequences may be enormous, and far-reaching : in laws, stand-
ards, customs (as seen in the history of rehgions), in private and
pubHc worship, in priesthoods and sacrifices, in rituals and in
sacred writings, in ascetical abnegation and inspired rhapsody and
mystic transport—all depending upon the social outlook and the
'ps^'chology" of the individuals involved. Hence religion has many
and diverse vestures and embodiments. The revelation comes 'in
many parts and after divers manners.' But the heart of it is one,
and really continuous—even when viewed as a purely human his-
torical phenomenon. At heart, it is the aw^areness of God ; and for
religion— i. e. for religious men and women—this means, in one
form or another, revelation : God chooses that man shall become
aware of Him; the Universal touches the particular; the Infinite
Spirit breaks through the bonds of finitude ; the Absolute embraces
the individual. Put it in whatever language you prefer, philo-
sophical, poetical, or prosaic, religion is apparently unable to do
without the conception—if religious men think at all—of the Divine
coming in contact with the human. So that 'awareness of God'
may be only the inebriate dance of frenzied nature-worshippers
;
or it may rise to the heights of the J^-ologue of St. John and the
Catholic faith in the Incarnation, or to mystic ecstasy
;
yet all
along, in the simple language of religion, God is 'making Himself
known to men.'
But of what value is this experience, someone will ask. Cannot
we do without it in this modern age of independence of ancient
forms of thinking and inherited patterns of feeling and behavior?
I must answer this by another question: What would life be worth
if the values which religion has enshrined in the past, and still
enshrines, w'ere blotted out? What would life be worth if
the ethical values were obliterated? And where, as a matter of
history, have ethical values obtained dominance in human society,
and maintained this dominance, save in alliance with some form of
the awareness of God? It is useless to point to religions that have
no God ; for in such religions the mass of their followers have, as a
matter of fact, worshipped a God, or gods; while, for the elect,
some universal principle or law has taken the place of God and
functions in His stead, as the object of 'awareness' or the principle
from which flow the 'consequences' which make up the concrete
manifestations of the 'religion.' Nor is it wholly relevant to point
to the discordance and antagonism between one ethical system and
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another, or even between the ethical principles of one religion and
another. The s\stems clash—but that is often because the\' are
systems : in less systematic form, in less articulate, individual expres-
sion. the\- more readily flow into one another, accommodate them-
selves to one another, and unite in safeguarding those basic values
which give worth to human life. Xor, finally, is it conclusive to
point to the lowlv origin of our sense of ethical values, or to dis-
tinguish this sharplv from the religious sense. Granted that the
ethical values originated in even sub-human social orders, in the
ethics of the herd, the pack, the lowly colony or group of animals
pitting its strength against a difficult or dangerous environment, and
unconsciously but inevitably demanding patience, honor, self-sacri-
fice, from its members—or what in human behavior goes by these
names : granted all this, it is still significant that with the emergence
of religion the grouj)-consciousness found therein its most powerful
allv and support. If ethical origins may be traced back to sub-
human biological stages, so also, one would almost venture to guess,
mav religious origins : that is, the motives that religion cherishes,
in chief the consciousness of the "Superhuman." the 'Awe-ful.' the
'W'hollv Other"—to use Professor Rudolf Otto's terminology
—
these motives and this consciousness are so deepl}' laid in human
nature that one would not be surprised if they sprang from a
biological origin. Which is by no means to say that that is the
end of them. Does a sub-human origin of speech, in the rude
sounds of the lower animals, disqualif}' the orator or the singer?
Does it keep presidential candidates from making speeches, or
millions of citizens from listening to them, b} radio or otherwise?
And it is surely significant that on their upward march, religion
and ethics have become more and more closely allied : the sense
of ought, and along with it the sense of someone, something, out-
side, above, objective to and set over against the human conscious-
ness. The identification of the voice of duty with the voice of God
underlies the history of the higher religions.
But if we thus grant the value of religion, a still further ques-
tion arises as to its validity. The experience may be valuable—we
hold that it is—but is it true? Or if parti}- true and partly untrue,
how are we to distinguish the true from the false? It is here that
philosophy of religion must lean most strongly upon its philosophic
training and inheritance. What is the criterion of truth in any
department of knowledge or of thought? At once we shall be
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told bv some that it is demonstrable correspondence with fact ; by
others that it is logical consistency, that it must 'hang together,'
and demonstrably meet the requirements of thought. (These two
answers, by the way, almost completely divide the world of phil-
osophy, past and present—if taken in a broad sense.) But it may
be asking too much to require religious experience to demonstrate
its correspondence with external fact. It may do so, up to a cer-
tain point : but it may not be able to exhaust the whole range of
potential fact. Do we ask of aesthetic judgments that they shall
correspond with facts ? Yes, we do ; taken in the large sense, and
recognizing certain qualities in 'facts' not given in immediate sense-
perception or in scientific analysis. A dozen strokes of the violin-
bow may mean only so much energy at work, so many vibrations
produced, so much sound ; or they may mean, in their real essence,
something nearer akin to the flight of a swallow or the charge of
a brigade or the death of a child. If the essential quality of human
life is, perchance, spiritual and not material, then the 'facts' to
which religious experience may be required to correspond will be
of a higher and vaster order than those of physical sensation.
No one here, I suppose, will contradict this statement. If not, then
we proceed to the next consideration, namely, that the 'facts' to
which religious experience must correspond may be themselves
indemonstrable and yet real. I am quite free to grant that the
arguments for the existence of God may one and all succeed no
futher than in setting up 'the noblest hypothesis' to explain human
life, the ordered universe, the moral sense, or the all but endless
recessive series of causation. With Professor Webb I agree that
the theistic arguments are reasons men have given for a faith,
springing out of experience, which they could not help but hold.^
But the same is true of other existences. How prove your own
existence, as a conscious, self-directing, super-physical being?
Cogito, ergo sum may be a logical inference for the man him-
self ; for all others it is an act of faith—or 'the noblest hypothesis,'
under the circumstances. For there are not wanting those who
would reduce human cogitation, and with it the existence of a free,
self-directing, individual personality, to the behavior of atoms in
an inherited pattern which has been moulded by the long, slow
process of biological adaptation and evolution. I do not think such
scepticism is necessary, or even warranted; in philosophy, as in
5 Problems in the Relations of God and Man, pp. 154 ff.
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human thought and hfe generally, there are some things one must
take for granted ; for apart from such assumptions the whole
process refuses to work, to go, to make even the initial start. And
the idea of God—or rather, the real, objective existence of God
—
is the initial assumption presupposed in most religious experience.
I feel that we are often in danger of too much abstractness in
studving religion. We treat it as an idea ; we deal with religion
as if it were dissociable from experience; we propose such ques-
tions as. 'Gan religion function without God?" and forget that
religion is nothing if it is not experience, that the intellectual ele-
ment is secondary and derivative, and that we cannot know religion
unless we get really inside the experience which gives it meaning
and makes it religious. There is no reason, so far as I can gather,
why a philosopher of religion or a student of philosophy should
not sav his prayers, attend and share in public worship, examine
his conscience and live a religious life in simple earnestness and
humble piety. Only so can the language of religion acquire its full
meaning, and the student find out for himself what religious men
are talking, about when the\- use words that really have a sense and
connotation hidden from the casual hearer or superficial investi-
gator. It is in experience—not hectic, over-wrought emotionalism,
but normal, daily, pedestrian religious experience—that the student
will begin to grasp the finer shades of meaning in the language of
saints and seers, inspired prophets and religious philosophers.
Something of the same dissatisfaction attends the second pro-
posed criterion of validit}', viz., the test of 'rational coherence,'
'demonstrable correspondence with the requirements of thought.'
For your judgment of rational coherence may not be mine, or any
one's else. Your social background and that of a Hindu or a Bantu
or a Turk may be quite distinctly different; and the 'requirements
of thought' may correspondingly vary. One may require a hier-
archy of emanations interposing between the Absolute and the
individual, the Infinite and the finite ; another may require a God
seen in every action and event; another a transcendent God who,
nevertheless, stands in closest contact with the visible world of
phenomena, working His purpose out through events, ordinary or
extraordinary, 'natural' or miraculous. A solution might be to
cast up 'the world's best thought' on the subject, and then validate
this with the imprimatur of authority. But this will not do, im-
posing as such an authority might be made, and valuable as it
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would be for some purposes. For philosophy must be free and
entitled to testify, like St. Athanasius, if necessary, contra mun-
dum. The basis I propose Is one broader still: not rational coher-
ence, merely, but triith to life. For there are situations in human
life where rationality has little to offer; where' we can think and
ponder without rest and be no nearer a solution ; where not thought,
primarily, but action is required—action guided by thought, perhaps,
but by thought more heavily loaded than usual with emotion ; by
thought, but thought too deep for reasons or for words. In such
hours the habits of a lifetime come to the fore and the man's real
self, deeper than his intellectual nature, stands out clear in the open.
For there is a self—a mind, perhaps, at any rate an activity of some
sort—deeper than consciousness and deeper than rationality. It
may be onl}' the crude biological vital center of the individual life ;
or it may be the channel uniting him with the universal life; or per-
haps it is that divine seed or spark implanted by the creative hand
of God (and men have called it one or another of all three) ; what-
ever it is, the real self, or an important part of it, lodges there.
And religion means man's attunement with his whole environment
in the very center of his being, at one with the universe, at peace
with God, in a coherence deeper than thought and with a rationality
deeper than logic. Herein lies the real validation of religious exper-
ience. It satisfies requirements larger and more mandatory than
those of rational thought ; and it satisfies rational thought, as a rule
( certainly for the normal religious individual ) , because it satisfies
requirements which thought itself must satisfy. In a word, the
world is much bigger than we think it is, with these intellects of
ours, born to guide us through certain ranges of phenomena I'ust
as eyes were born to use light, and feet for locomotion, and hands
for manipulating small, loose objects. And in this bigger world,
religion, or the religious consciousness, and with it the moral sense,
represents an adaptation just as real and just as valid as the physical
senses or the biological instincts or the rational intellect. It is
possible to be adjusted to God, and adapted to the spiritual qualities
or factors in the universe, quite as much as it is possible to be
adapted to a space-time environment and to the competition for
survival or for ready access to a stable food-supply.
But how are we to explain the varieties and contrarities of
religious experience, on such a theory? The answer is the old one
of the mystics: the light is not various, but one; variety is the work
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of the prism through which it passes. In essence, all religion is
one, and truth or falsehood in religion is a matter of gradations,
not of absolute contradictions. The pious Buddhist, the saintl}- Mo-
hammedan, the godl}- Christian and the pious Jew are not. in truth,
worshipping different Gods—that cannot be, for God is one. They
approach b_\- different routes; their progress is measured not so
much bv relation to each other—that would be a difficult problem
in calculus—as by relation to the common center and goal of all
their striving. Thev are all cii route to God, 'who is their home.'
If I may be allowed to summarize this argument in a few words
it will be as follows
:
First, the Philosoph}' of Religion, like other branches of Philoso-
phy, must go back once more and set out afresh from tirst-hand
experience, leaving aside, at least at the outset, the metaphysical or
other intellectual constructions of the past, and facing religious
experience itself in its widest reaches and meanings. This, as I
believe, cannot be accomplished unless the philosopher of religion
has himself a rich and various inner religious life, is himself aware
of God, and is willing to carr}- out the consecjuences of such aware-
ness in his own life and in the life of his own particular corner of
the world.
Second, the affirmations of religious men in all ages and climes
must be taken fully into account, from the crudest and humblest to
the loftiest and most complex. Xo science is developed in isola-
tion, in these da_\s ; nor is any full-orbed philosoph}' likely to grow
out of purely private speculation. The 'realistic" and the 'social'
notes in modern thinking are more than accidental features : they
are vital and inescapable factors in all modern thought, philosophic
or any other, which can claim wide satisfaction or offer permanent
solution of our problems.
Third, this very quality of tolerance, catholicity, comprehensive-
ness, must be acquired as soon as possible by our teachers and stu-
dents alike. The philosopher of religion who should leave out of
reckoning the non-Christian t}pes of religious experience would
prove himself incompetent from the outset for his task. But the
same ought to be true of anyone who proposed to leave out of con-
sideration the Protestant or the Catholic types of Christian exper-
ience, the orthodox and dogmatic or the evangelical or the mystic.
There are values here—rich veins for exploration and exposition
—
underlying every one of these terms. Every one of them represents
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some pathway to reality, more or less direct. And the older forms
of piety, e. g. Calvinism or Puritanism, ought to be studied with all
the historical sympathy and understanding we can muster. Perhaps
I ought to choose Catholicism for my example. For' it has often
happened that philosophers of religion have neglected Catholicism
—either on account of the inheritance of strong Protestant preju-
dices or because of the difficulty, unfamiliarity, or inaccessibility of
the subject. This does not mean that our philosopher of religion
should adopt an attitude for which all 'forms' of religion are indif-
ferent, and 'one as good as another.' That is to pre-judge the situ-
ation, and effectually to close the mind against the discovery of
fresh values, and to anticipate a conclusion, ex hypothesi, which
renders all further research futile and meaningless.
Fourth, he must emulate the example of one of our most eminent
metaphysicians and 'accept' the data of religious experience 'in
simple piety.' There is time for criticism, plenty of time ; but first
let us get the facts clearly before us, or what are assumed to be the
facts, or are claimed as such by those who assert them. The wit-
ness must be given 'the benefit of the dou'bt,' when doubt exists,
and must be presumed to be telling the truth unless obviously he is
lying, or has a clear motive for fabricating his testimony, or con-
tradicts himself. To me it is an impressive fact that all men every-
where or almost everywhere, agree in the broad fundamental assev-
erations of the religious consciousness—in the reality of the vmseen,
in the existence of a Power or Wisdom outside of and superior to
man. in the 'categorical imperative' of righteousness and self-sacri-
fice to higher ends understood as obedience to His will, or harmony
with the universe, or submission to 'the reason of things' generally.
Mystics, for example, in India and in America, in ancient Greece
and mediaeval Germany and modern Chicago, tell us something
about the inner life and the possibilities of union with the Supreme.
I cannot find that their testimony was agreed upon beforehand : and
instead of conflicting it seems to be mutually confirmatory to a
large degree. Catholics pray, and so do Quakers ; and despite their
conflicting theologies and discrepant patterns of experience, they do
find peace and strength and joy and illumination. There is reality
in it, and I cannot help but conclude that prayer is at least one
mode of access to the highest Wisdom and supreme Love in the
universe. It does not seem possible that they can all be wrong, and
the truth be either that there is no God or that He is inaccessible and
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unknowable. The presumption is that they speak the truth, and
that 'God is. and is the rewarder of them that dihgently seek Him.'^
I do not mean that the truth of reHgion stands or falls with unani-
mity or universality of testimony; there are ranges of truth in every
sphere of human interest that cannot be so established. But the
existence of such evidence certainly creates an impression favorable
to its truth, and deserving to be reckoned with by the philosopher
of religion as among his most primary data.
I sometimes wish we could really go back and start over again
with some of our problems, setting out as Plato and Aristotle set
out in a territory not too well known, mapped out in advance, and
covered with sign-posts and other memorials of great names in the
past or of theories fallen into decay. Such a wish is of course
preposterous—there was a tradition even in Plato's da_\-, and even in
Homer's, and probably there has been, in science, philosophy, and
religion ever since men began to observe, to think, and to pray. At
the very least, however, our philosopher can study the theories of
the past sut^ciently to think through some of them, and emerge on
the other side. AVhereupon he himself is confronted with the pri-
mary situation, as it faced earlier students and thinkers, with the
question, What is the ultimate truth of all this? Such study of the
past is bracing, not unnerving, and the student is a student of phil-
osophy, or of religion, and not merely of its history.
But supposing we could attack the problems afresh and at first-
hand, as the founders of the tradition themselves attacked them,
would not one of our first observations be the following?—Here is
a mass of various but not wholly discordant testimony, a mass of
te5timon\' springing out of inner experience, experience that we our-
selves mav share in some degree. The all but unanimous witness is
that this experience is not fallacious, and that God, the spiritual
world, the inner core of life and the meaning of human destiny may
really be apprehended and truly, not falsely, known—though not,
perhaps, exhaustively. Then we should proceed to what Plato and
his successors called Theology,'^ the rational knowledge of God or
the gods, and the consistent elaboration of whatever hypothesis or
'myth' best accounted for the facts and 'saved the appearances,' as
the Stoics said. So much of our time is taken up with the examina-
tion and criticism of theories that men grow bewildered and wonder
fi Heb. xi. 6.
7 Rep. 379A.
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if anything exists to correspond with the subjects or relations under
debate. That was the western world's criticism of Scholasticism
—
but it is a danger by no means limited to one period or school of
thought. And though my hope may be a forlorn one, I still believe
there is something to be said at least for such an emphasis in the
philosophic study of religion. Puzzled as we are often times by the
many minor and secondary questions, let us not lose sight of the
primary and ultimate ones. There have in fact been philosophers
who resembled the man in Robinson Crusoe's Further Adventures,
who sawed off a limb to dislodge a bear but was himself on the
outer end of the limb.
My fifth observation is that religion is to be studied, by the philo-
sophic student, in its actual practice, not only in books, in liturgies
and sermons, in sacred scriptures, in the records of the past. And
the very heart of it comes nearest being unveiled in the act of wor-
ship. Here the Numinous is actually felt by most religious men
;
and without worship, religions tend to decline. When the warm,
pulsing, vibrant life-stream of religious worship fails, the religion
is doomed—unless, as often happens, that doom is averted by a
religious revival. As William James put it a generation ago,
religion functions through 'prayer, guidance, and all that sort of
thing immediately and privately felt," rather than through 'high and
noble general views of our destiny and the world's meaning.' Alore-
over, somewhat in contrast to James' later treatment, this sort of
immediate apprehension of the divine is to be studied and known in
its normal rather than its abnormal phases. The saints, the con-
verts, the twice-born have something to tell us ; but so have the pious
everyday folk who love justice and mercy and walk humbly with
their God. And it is not impossbile that their testimony, less dra-
matic but wider in extent, may prove of even greater importance in
the construction of an outlook upon reality in the light of religious
experience. If this is so, it has a good deal of significance for the
present-day student, when towering genius in religion seems to be
growing rare, and at least the first half of Browning's prayer to be
fulfilled
:
'Make no more giants, God,
But elevate the race.'^
'Pedestrian' religion, if it be centred in God and really in contact
8 Paracelsus.
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with the supernatural, is good enough for our purposes; indeed, it
has some quahties that recommend a preferential consideration
—
for example, it does not so readily disap[)ear in the alembic of the
abnormal psychologist.
Finally, let me offer a parting affirmation of my belief that this
new method has all the future before it. The range of ]:)Ossible
experience in the external, space-time universe is b}' no means }et
exhausted : far from it ! Some of irs have still to take our first
aeroplane ride ! Xor are the mysteries of nature by an_\- means
exhaustively explored and catalogued by our scientific investigators.
Nor has philosophy }et written its final chapter—we study its past
in large measure in order to prepare for its future developments,
as the diver goes back and runs toward the s|)ringboard for his
plunge. Xor have we made much more than a beginning in the philo-
sophic stud}' of religion. Here lie rich veins for the patient miner,
vast ranges of data for the ardent collector of facts, for the classi-
fier and tabulator of phenomena. But above all, religion itself, true
spiritual religion, is still in its infanc}', as an adaptation of life—and
of thought, following life, but guiding it as it follow\s—as an adap-
tation of human life to a wider sphere of reality than ordinaril}-
enters our ken. As a Christian, I believe profoundh' that 'the best
is yet to be' and that untold riches of light, of guidance, of know-
ledge and illumination, of nobler ethical achievement, of further
spiritual discover}-, lie on before us in the uncharted future. And
as a Christian I may sa}' that, for me, it is Christ Himself who leads
in that direction.
